We mathematically compare three competing definitions of grouplevel nondiscrimination: demographic parity, equalized odds, and calibration. Using the theoretical framework of Friedler et al., we study the properties of each definition under various worldviews, which are assumptions about how, if at all, the observed data is biased. We prove that different worldviews call for different definitions of fairness, and we specify when it is appropriate to use demographic parity and equalized odds. In addition, we argue that calibration is unsuitable for the purpose of ensuring nondiscrimination. Finally, we define a worldview that is more realistic than the previously considered ones, and we introduce a new notion of fairness that is suitable for this worldview.
INTRODUCTION
As the field of machine learning has grown to influence many aspects of our lives, so have concerns about the effects of its potential biases. These biases are especially problematic if they disproportionately favor one demographic group over another. Legally, many jurisdictions around the world prohibit discrimination on the basis of a protected attribute, such as race or gender. One category of prohibited discrimination is disparate impact, or indirect discrimination, which means that the use of the model must not result in discriminatory effect even if the discrimination is not intentional. As a result, it is not sufficient for the model to simply avoid using the protected attribute since it may arrive at the same result by using another attribute that is correlated with the protected one.
Many different notions of fairness have been proposed in efforts to better understand the issue of discrimination in machine learning. The most common notion is demographic parity, which requires that the model give the favorable outcome to both groups of people at equal rates. However, sometimes there are reasons to believe that the model should not give equal outcomes, such as when predicting physical strength for different genders. Because of this, jurisdictions that recognize disparate impact also make exceptions for cases where there is sufficient justification for the discriminatory effect, such as business necessity [e.g., 1, 11] . This motivates moving away from demographic parity to definitions that take the ground truth into account. One such definition, called equalized odds by Hardt et al. [12] , requires equal false positive and false negative rates for each protected group. Another commonly used notion of fairness is calibration [e.g., 4], which roughly corresponds to the requirement of equal positive predictive values. However, one drawback of equalized odds and calibration is that the "ground truth" may be tainted by past discrimination, in which case consulting the ground truth will help perpetuate the discrimination.
In this work, we handle the issue of biased ground truth by adopting the framework of Friedler et al. [9] , who make the distinction between the observed ground truth and the construct, which is the attribute that is truly relevant for prediction. Using this framework, we define what it means for a model to be discriminative, that is, able to accurately predict the construct, and discriminatory, that is, disproportionately favoring one protected group over another in an unjustified way. Our definition of discrimination deals with the disparity in positive classification rates, which is a widely accepted measure of discriminatory effect in both law [7] and computer science [2, 3, 8, 13, 22, 23] . Unlike most prior definitions, our definition also considers the benefit of having a discriminative model, stipulating that a disparity in the output of the model is justified by a commensurate disparity in the construct. We note that we do not address other aspects of discrimination, such as intentional discrimination [1, .
Because the construct is usually unmeasurable, Friedler et al. introduce and analyze two assumptions, or worldviews, about the construct. More specifically, they define the We're All Equal (WAE) worldview, under which there is no association between the construct and the protected attribute, and the WYSIWYG worldview, under which the observations accurately reflect the construct. We tie in the previously defined notions of fairness with these worldviews, proving that demographic parity is appropriate for the WAE worldview and that equalized odds is appropriate for the WYSI-WYG worldview. We also show that calibration does not impose any restrictions on the extent to which a model discriminates. Since equalized odds and calibration are incompatible [4, 14] , our result is an argument for the use of equalized odds instead of calibration. Furthermore, we compare our approach to that of Zafar et al. [21] in their work on disparate mistreatment, or disparate misclassification rates, showing that our definition of nondiscrimination can be modified to apply in their setting.
Although the WAE and WYSIWYG worldviews are useful for theoretical analysis, they are unlikely to be true in practice. To remedy this issue, we introduce a family of hybrid worldviews that is parametrized by a measure of how biased the observed data is against a protected group of people. This allows us to model many real-world situations by simply adjusting the parameter. We then create a parametrized fairness definition that is suitable for the new family of worldviews, showing how one can apply the analysis in our paper to real-world scenarios.
Our most fundamental contribution is the introduction of a framework in which to evaluate proposed definitions of fairness. We do not claim that the definition of nondiscrimination that we use in this paper captures the only relevant notion of nondiscrimination. Rather, we view our definition as more of a diagnostic than a goal in and of itself. Indeed, we do not provide an algorithm for ensuring that a model complies with our definition of nondiscrimination since, in our view, doing so would be treating the symptom rather than the cause. Such algorithms can eliminate one aspect of discrimination, but may in the process create a model that is obviously discriminatory from another angle. When a model does not satisfy a definition of nondiscrimination, it should be a starting point for investigation as to why. While it could be that the model itself is corrupt, it could also be due to a mismatch between the construct and the observed data, or a need for better features. We remind the reader that no one algorithm can fix all ills.
RELATED WORK
Barocas and Selbst [1] discuss in detail the potential legal issues with discrimination in machine learning. One widely consulted legal standard for detecting disparate impact is the four-fifths rule [7] . The four-fifths rule is a guideline that checks whether the ratio of the rates of favorable outcomes for different demographic groups is at least four-fifths. This guideline can be considered a relaxation of demographic parity, which would instead require that the ratio of the positive classification rates be exactly one.
The four-fifths rule has inspired the work of Feldman et al. [8] and Zafar et al. [22] , who deal with a generalization of the fourfifths rule, called the p% rule, in their efforts to remove disparate impact. On the other hand, many others [2, 3, 13, 23] consider the difference, rather than the ratio, of the positive classification rates. (See Romei and Ruggieri for a general discussion of various measures [17, §3.1] .) Our definition of nondiscrimination is a generalization of this difference-based measure, which is more amenable to generalization than the ratio-based one. However, our definition differs from the others in that it uses the construct rather than the observed data.
Friedler et al. [9] introduced the concept of the construct in machine learning. Although they also use the construct in their definition of nondiscrimination, their definition uses the Gromov-Wasserstein distance and as a result is more difficult to compute and reason about. One benefit of their approach is that it enables their treatment of fairness at both an individual level and a group level. By contrast, we adopt a definition that is specialized for the consideration of group nondiscrimination only.
Other works in the field of fair machine learning deal with aspects of nondiscrimination that are not well described by positive classification rates. Datta et al. [6] tackle the issue that some parts of a model could be discriminatory even if the model, when taken as a whole, does not appear to have discriminatory effect. Zafar et al. [21] point out a that a model can have a higher misclassification rate for one protected group than another, and they propose a method for mitigating this form of discrimination. Hardt et al. [12] characterize nondiscrimination through equalized odds, which requires that two measures of misclassification, false positive and false negative rates, be equal for all protected groups. Finally, calibration, Chouldechova [4] points out, is widely accepted in the "educational and psychological testing and assessment literature". In this paper, we prove that equalized odds, but not calibration, is sometimes a useful way to satisfy our definition of nondiscrimination.
As mentioned previously, discriminatory effect can be justified if there is a sufficient reason. For prediction tasks, it is natural to think of accuracy as a sufficient justification. Zafar et al. [22] handle this by solving an optimization problem to maximize fairness subject to some accuracy constraints. This reflects the idea that a classifier is justified in sacrificing fairness for accuracy. To a lesser extent, equalized odds and calibration can also be thought of as motivated by the dual desires for accuracy and fairness. Our approach to justification is also motivated by these desires, but we use the construct and say that a classifier is justified in predicting the construct correctly.
NOTATION
In the framework introduced by Friedler et al. [9] , there are three spaces that describe the target attribute of a prediction model. The construct space represents the value of the attribute that is truly relevant for the prediction task. This value is usually unmeasurable, so prediction models in a supervised learning problem are instead trained with a related measurable label, whose values reside in the observed space. Finally, the prediction space (called decision space by Friedler et al.) describes the output of the model. We will use Y ′ , Y , andŶ as the random variables representing values from the construct, observed, and prediction spaces, respectively.
In addition, we will use Z to denote the protected attribute at hand, and we will assume that Z ∈ {0, 1}. For example, if Z is gender, the values 0 and 1 could represent male and female, respectively. Although the input features X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) are also critical for both the training and the prediction of the model, they are rarely used in this paper. Example 1. Some jurisdictions have started to use machine learning models to predict how much risk a criminal defendant poses [15] . Judges are then allowed to consider the risk score as one of many factors when making bail or sentencing decisions [19] . Using the three-space framework of Friedler et al. [9] , we can represent the risk score output by the model asŶ . The model would be trained with the observation Y , which in this case may be recorded data about past criminal defendants and their failures to appear in court (bail) or recidivism (sentencing). These models would also be trained with features X from the input space, such as age and criminal history. For sentencing decisions, presumably we want to know whether the defendant will commit another crime in the future, regardless of whether the defendant will be caught committing the crime. Therefore, we argue that the recorded recidivism rate Y is merely a proxy for the actual reoffense rate Y ′ , which is the relevant attribute for the prediction task. There is evidence that black Americans are arrested at a higher rate than white Americans for the same crime [16] , so it is reasonable to suspect that Y is a racially biased proxy for Y ′ . Example 2. Universities want the students that they admit to the university to be successful in the university (Y ′ ). Because success is a vague term that encompasses many factors, a model that predicts success in university would instead be trained with a more concrete measure, such as graduating within six years (Y ). This model may take inputs such as a student's high-school grades and standardized test scores (X ), and will output a prediction of how likely the student is to graduate within six years (Ŷ ). Admissions officers can then use this prediction to guide their decision about whether to admit the student. It is important to note that the models in the above examples do not make the final decision and that human judgments are a major part of the decision process. However, we are concerned about the fairness of the model rather than that of the entire decision process. Thus, we focus onŶ , the output of the model, rather than the final decision made using it. In addition, although the use of the protected attribute Z is generally prohibited, it is sometimes allowed for affirmative action, or positive discrimination, that aims to correct a demographic disparity. For example, many U.S. universities take the race and gender of the students into account with the goal of admitting a diverse group of students. We limit the scope of our work to the case where the model is not trained with affirmative action or diversity as one of its objectives. We note that the humanled decision process that usesŶ may still consider these objectives.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
In this work, we use two notions of distance between two random variables that measure how different the random variables are. When the random variables are categorical, we use the total variation distance.
Definition 1 (Total Variation Distance). Let Y 0 and Y 1 be categorical random variables with finite support Y. Then, the total variation distance between Y 0 and Y 1 is
In the special case where Y 0 , Y 1 ∈ {0, 1}, the total variation distance can also be expressed as | Pr
If the random variables are numerical, we want to take into account the magnitude of the difference in the numerical values, so the earthmover distance is more appropriate. The following definition assumes that the random variables are continuous, but a similar definition is applicable when they are discrete instead. Definition 2 (Earthmover Distance). Let Y 0 and Y 1 be continuous numerical random variables with probability density functions p 0 and p 1 defined over support Y. Furthermore, let Γ be the set of joint
The joint probability density function γ has marginal distributions that correspond to Y 0 and Y 1 . Intuitively, if we use the graphs of the probability density functions p 0 and p 1 to represent mounds of sand, γ corresponds to a transportation plan that dictates how much sand to transport in order to reshape the p 0 mound into the p 1 mound. In particular, the value of γ (u, v) is the amount of sand to be transported from u to v. The distance d(u, v) can then be interpreted as the cost of transporting one unit of sand from u to v, and the earthmover distance is simply the cost of the transportation plan γ that incurs the least cost. Now we define Lipschitz continuity.
Fairness Definitions as Empirical Tests
Many definitions of fairness for prediction models have been proposed previously, and here we restate three of them. In all three definitions, the probabilities are taken over random draws of data points from the data distribution, as well as any randomness used by the model. 
Definition 5 (Eqalized Odds Test [12] ). A model passes the equalized odds test if, for all y andŷ,
Definition 6 (Calibration Test [4] ). A model passes the calibration test if, for all y andŷ,
Because much of the previous work does not make the distinction between the construct space and the observed space, there is some ambiguity about whether Y ′ or Y is the appropriate variable to use these definitions. In this paper, we interpret these definitions to be empirical tests that can verify whether a model is fair. As a result, none of the above definitions include the construct Y ′ .
Although all of the above definitions were created for the purpose of characterizing nondiscrimination, we will refer to them as fairness definitions or empirical tests in order to clearly contrast them with the definition of nondiscrimination that we later introduce.
Worldviews
Our intuitive notion of nondiscrimination involves the relationship between the construct space and the prediction space. For example, consider the context of recidivism prediction described in Example 1. Suppose that one group of people is much more likely to be arrested for the same crime than another group. Then, the disparity in arrest rates can cause the recorded recidivism rate Y to be biased, and a model trained using such Y would likely learn to discriminate as a result. If in fact the two groups have equal reoffense rates Y ′ , it would hardly be considered justified that one group tends to be given longer sentences as a result of the bias in Y .
However, because Y ′ is unmeasurable, in practice we do not know whether Y ′ is the same for both groups. Therefore, to reason about nondiscrimination using the construct space, we must make assumptions about the construct space. Two such assumptions, or worldviews, have previously been introduced by Friedler et al. [9] and are described below. Our versions of these worldviews are simpler than the original because they are exact, whereas the original versions allow deviations by some parameter ϵ.
Construct space
Worldviews Fairness (Empirical Tests) Nondiscrimination, Optimality Figure 1 : Three relevant spaces for prediction models. Left out is the space of input features X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ). The observed space and the prediction space are measurable, and the fairness definitions, which are interpreted as empirical tests, (Definitions 4, 5, 6) impose constraints on the relationship between the two spaces. On the other hand, the construct space is usually unmeasurable, so we must assume a particular worldview (e.g., Worldview 1 or 2) about how the construct space relates to the observed space, if at all. Then, we can characterize nondiscrimination and optimality, which are properties of the relationship between the construct space and the prediction space.
Worldview 1 (We're All Eqal). Under the We're All Equal (WAE) worldview, every group is identical with respect to the construct
Worldview 2 (WYSIWYG). Under the What You See Is What You Get (WYSIWYG) worldview, the observed space accurately reflects the construct space. More formally, Y ′ = Y .
DISCRIMINATORY ASSOCIATION
In this section, we introduce our definition of nondiscrimination and use it to analyze the suitability of existing fairness definitions under different worldviews. We first begin with case where Y ′ and Y are categorical, and later we will generalize the definition to numerical Y ′ .
Our definition of nondiscrimination is motivated by the following two concerns: First, we want the model to be discriminative, i.e., the output of the model should accurately reflect the value of Y ′ . We formalize this goal with the following definition of optimality. Definition 7 (Optimality). We say that a model is optimal if its outputŶ and the construct Y ′ are always equal.
This notion of optimality might seem narrow, but recall that we are judging the model as a predictor, which is not necessarily the final decision. The final decision might consider not just the prediction, but also factors such as affirmative action. The optimality of the final decision may be judged by a more complex standard, such as one accounting for both accuracy and diversity.
Second, we do not want the model to have a discriminatory effect. WhenŶ is binary, the size of the discriminatory effect is commonly measured by | Pr[Ŷ =1|Z =0] − Pr[Ŷ =1|Z =1]|, or the difference in positive classification rates. Definition 8 is a generalization of this measure for the case of non-binary categoricalŶ . However, not all output disparities are bad. In particular, because we want the model to be discriminative, we allow an output disparity insofar as it can be explained by the inter-group disparity in Y ′ . This happens when
Since a model can have issues with discrimination that are not well characterized by output disparity (discussed below), it is not entirely correct to claim that Equation 2 is the conclusive definition of nondiscrimination. Therefore, we use the logical negation of Equation 2 as the definition of one particular form of discrimination, which occurs when an output disparity is not explained by Y ′ .
Definition 9 (Discriminatory Association, Categorical Y ′ ). Let Y ′ andŶ be categorical. Then, a model exhibits discriminatory association that is unexplainable by
Note that, as stated in Lemma 1 below, the equality in Equation 2 holds for every optimal model. That is, an optimal model displays the maximum amount of output disparity allowed by Definition 9.
On the other hand, if the output disparity is greater than the disparity in Y ′ , the model must be discriminating in a way that cannot be explained by Y ′ .
Proof. For optimal models, Y ′ =Ŷ . □
Of course, there are forms of discrimination that are not well described by output disparity alone. For example, a model could have a higher misclassification rate for one group of people [21] , and Definition 9 is not well-suited for detecting such errors. In addition, even if Definition 9 does not show a violation (i.e., Equation 3 does not hold) for the entire model, it is possible that some part of the model is a proxy for the protected attribute and that it causes a Table 1 : Summary of the results in Section 5. The demographic parity test is appropriate when the We're All Equal (WAE) worldview holds, but otherwise it leads to suboptimal models. The equalized odds test is appropriate when the WYSIWYG worldview holds, but otherwise it does not effectively prevent discrimination. Here, we assume that WAE and WYSIWYG do not hold simultaneously. discriminatory effect. In their work on proxy use, Datta et al. [6] show that the input/output behavior of the model does not give enough information to decide whether a model uses a proxy of the protected attribute. As a result, we would have to look at the internal details of the model to determine whether any part of the model is discriminatory. On the other hand, Definition 9 is intended to be a general, model-agnostic way to incriminate, but not necessary absolve, a model. Now that we have defined optimality (Definition 7) and DAU-Y ′ (Definition 9), we are ready to argue about the suitability of an empirical test for a particular worldview. If an empirical test disallows an optimal model, we can conclude that the test is too strict in a way that lowers the utility of the model. On the other hand, if a test allows the output disparity to be greater than the disparity in Y ′ , the test does not guarantee DAU-Y ′ and therefore is not sufficient as an anti-discrimination measure. Therefore, to argue that an empirical test is appropriate, we will prove the following two statements:
(1) For all models that pass the empirical test, the model does not have DAU-Y ′ . (2) Every optimal model passes the empirical test. We apply this reasoning to demographic parity (Definition 4) and equalized odds (Definition 5), showing that these empirical tests are appropriate for the WAE and WYSIWYG worldviews, respectively. In particular, we will prove that the above statements are true for every joint distribution of Y ′ , Y ,Ŷ , and Z that is consistent with the worldview. Table 1 summarizes these results. Proof. By the definition of demographic parity, the left-hand side of Equation 3 is d tv (Ŷ |Z =0,Ŷ |Z =1) = 0. Since the total variation distance is always nonnegative, demographic parity ensures the lack of DAU-Y ′ .
Demographic Parity and WAE
If the WAE worldview holds, we have Y ′ ⊥ Z , so every optimal model satisfiesŶ ⊥ Z . This implies demographic parity by Definition 4. □
The first part of Theorem 2 shows that we can guarantee that a model will not have DAU-Y ′ by training it to pass the demographic parity test. However, this does not mean that demographic parity is appropriate for every situation. First, we remind the reader that the lack of DAU-Y ′ does not mean that the model will be free of all issues related to discrimination. In particular, DAU-Y ′ is only designed to catch the type of discrimination akin to disparate impact. If the WAE worldview holds, demographic parity is the only way to avoid DAU-Y ′ , so it makes sense to enforce demographic parity. On the other hand, if the WAE worldview does not hold, enforcing demographic parity may introduce other forms of discrimination. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ricci v. DeStefano [18] that the prohibition against intentional discrimination can sometimes override the consideration of disparate impact, ruling that an employer unlawfully discriminated by discarding the results of a bona fide job-related test simply because of a racial performance gap. Furthermore, Corbett-Davies and Goel [5] argue that enforcing gender parity in the context of criminal justice would be discriminatory against women since they really do have a lower reoffense rate.
Second, demographic parity can unnecessarily lower the utility of a model. In fact, Theorem 3 shows that, if the joint distribution of Y ′ , Y ,Ŷ , and Z is not consistent with the WAE worldview, any model that satisfies demographic parity must be suboptimal. Theorem 3. If the WAE worldview does not hold, no optimal model satisfies demographic parity.
Proof. If the WAE worldview does not hold, d tv (Y ′ |Z =0, Y ′ |Z =1), the right-hand side of Equation 3, is positive. This means that, by Lemma 1, the left-hand side d tv (Ŷ |Z =0,Ŷ |Z =1) must be positive for an optimal model. On the other hand, if a model satisfies demographic parity, the left-hand side must be zero. Therefore, no optimal model can satisfy demographic parity. □ Theorem 2 and 3 demonstrate that the demographic parity test is the most suitable when the WAE worldview holds.
Equalized Odds and WYSIWYG
We now argue that a similar relationship exists between the equalized odds test and the WYSIWYG worldview. 
This concludes the proof of the first statement.
For an optimal model, we have Y ′ = Y =Ŷ by the WYSIWYG worldview. Because Y fully determines the value ofŶ , it follows from Definition 5 that every optimal model satisfies equalized odds. □
We conclude this section by showing that equalized odds does not guarantee nondiscrimination unless the WYSIWYG worldview holds. This is consistent with our intuition that an output disparity is unjustified if it is due to a bias in the observation process. Proof. We show that there exists a joint distribution of Y ′ , Y , Y , and Z such that a model with equalized odds still has DAU-Y ′ .
Many models with equalized odds have nonzero output disparity, i.e., d tv (Ŷ |Z =0,Ŷ |Z =1) > 0. Consider any such model. Since the WYSIWYG worldview does not hold, we have no guarantee that Y ′ will resemble Y in any way. Therefore, the equalized odds requirement does not restrict the distribution of Y ′ , and the model
Unsuitability of Calibration
Switching Y ′ andŶ in the proof of Theorem 4 shows that the calibration test, when combined with the WYSIWYG worldview,
The inequality here is in the opposite direction of that in Equation 2, so the calibration test does not place any upper bound on the output disparity and guarantees that it is at least as large as can be explained by Y ′ . In fact, the following theorem shows that, regardless of the worldview, even a model with almost the maximum output disparity can still pass the calibration test. Theorem 6. Let Y ∈ {0, 1} such that Z does not fully determine the value of Y . Then, for any sufficiently small ϵ > 0, there exists a model that passes the calibration test such that d tv (Ŷ |Z =0,Ŷ |Z =1) = 1 − ϵ.
Proof. The main idea behind the proof is that the model simply outputs the value of Z . However, because calibration is not welldefined if Pr[Ŷ =ŷ, Z =z] = 0 for anyŷ and z, we must allow the model to output the other value with some very small probability. More specifically, we construct a model such that
By the calibration test, we have Pr
Our goal is to find the values of p 0 and p 1 that are consistent with the fixed observed probabilities Pr
By the law of total probability, our model must satisfy
As ϵ → 0, p 0 and
respectively. Due to our assumption that Z does not fully determine the value of Y , these probabilities are in the open interval (0, 1). Therefore, if ϵ > 0 is small enough, p 0 , p 1 ∈ (0, 1). Now, when given Y =y and Z =z, our model outputsŶ =1 with probability
where Pr[Y =y |Ŷ =1] is either p 1 or 1 − p 1 , and Pr[Ŷ =1 | Z =z] is either ϵ/2 or 1 − ϵ/2 depending on the value of y and z. □
Because the calibration test can allow for models, such as the one we constructed in the above proof, that are clearly discriminatory, it is unsuitable for ensuring nondiscrimination as characterized by output disparity. As a result, in the rest of the paper we focus on the equalized odds test rather than the calibration test.
Connection to Misclassification
Here, we show that our definition of nondiscrimination is closely related to the that given by Zafar et al. [21] in their treatment of disparate misclassification rates. First, we motivate the issue of disparate misclassification rates with an example. Let Y ′ and Z be independent and uniformly random binary variables. IfŶ = Y ′ ⊕ Z , where ⊕ is the bitwise XOR, both protected groups are given the positive label exactly half of the time, so there is no output disparity. However, one group always receives the correct classification and the other always receives the incorrect classification, so the disparity in the misclassification rates is as large as it can be. This shows that a lack of DAU-Y ′ does not imply a lack of disparity in misclassification rates.
Conversely, a lack of disparity in misclassification rates does not imply a lack of DAU-Y ′ . To see this, modify the above example so thatŶ = Z instead. In this case, both groups have half of its members misclassified since Z is independent of Y ′ , so they have the same overall misclassification rate. On the other hand, we have
However, we can still find a connection between misclassification parity and DAU-Y ′ . Let C = 1(Y ′ =Ŷ ), and replaceŶ with C in the definition of output disparity (Definition 8). Since C is binary, the resulting expression d tv (C |Z =0, C |Z =1) is simply the difference in the misclassification rates. We would like to compare this value to some measure of disparity in the construct space. Since our standard measure of d tv (Y ′ |Z =0, Y ′ |Z =1) does not necessarily justify inter-group differences in C, it may not be a correct measure to use. Exploring what measures provide justification for disparate misclassification rates is interesting future work.
Instead, we focus on the special case where the misclassification rates are exactly equal for each protected group, as done by Zafar et al. [21] . In this case, d tv (C |Z =0, C |Z =1) is zero, which is the lowest possible value for any total variation distance. Thus, no matter what measure of total variation distance is used for the disparity in the construct space, there trivially cannot be any DAU-Y ′ . This shows that a lack of disparity in misclassification rates implies a lack of DAU-Y ′ for C.
STRONGER DEFINITION OF NONDISCRIMINATION
Now we strengthen our definition of nondiscrimination in a way that is applicable even in the case where Y ′ is not categorical. Definition 9 allows an output disparity if there exists an equally large disparity in Y ′ , but it does not explicitly reflect the fact that we care about how the model came to exhibit the disparity. The only reason why we allow the disparity is that Y ′ is the right attribute to use. Thus, if the model does not use Y ′ at all, then there should be no output disparity. More formally, we want that if Y ′ ⊥Ŷ , then Y ⊥ Z .
Definition 10 generalizes this requirement and, unlike Definition 9, is applicable for both categorical and numerical Y ′ at the expense of limitingŶ to be binary. The generalization deals with cases whereŶ is not completely independent of Y ′ by measuring of how muchŶ depends upon Y ′ . For binaryŶ , this dependence is captured by the likelihood function ℓ(y ′ ) = Pr[Ŷ =1 | Y ′ =y ′ ], and we use the Lipschitz continuity (Definition 3) of this function to measure the dependence.
, let ρ * ℓ be the smallest nonnegative ρ such that ℓ is ρ-Lipschitz continuous. 1 Then, a model exhibits discriminatory association that is unexplainable by
ρ * ℓ characterizes how much impact Y ′ can have on the output of the model. If the impact is small, we can conclude that the model is not using Y ′ much, so not much output disparity can be explained by Y ′ . On the other hand, if a small change in Y ′ can cause a large change in the probability distribution ofŶ , then even a large output disparity can possibly be due to a small inter-group difference in Y ′ . In fact, the use of ρ * ℓ makes Definition 10 invariant to scaling in Y ′ . If a numerical Y ′ is increased by some factor, ρ * ℓ will decrease by the same factor, so the quantity on the right-hand side of Equation 4 will not change.
We now give two arguments that Definition 10 is the correct refinement of the previous definition (Definition 9). First, we show that the new definition is a broader definition of unexplainable discrimination than the previous one. The previous definition assumes that Y ′ is categorical, and in this case a natural distance metric for its support Y ′ is the indicator d(u, v) = 1(u v). With this distance metric, we can relate the total variation distance used in the right-hand side of Equation 3 with the earthmover distance used in Equation 4. Theorem 7. Let the construct Y ′ be categorical with support Y ′ , which has distance metric d(u, v) = 1(u v). If a model has DAU-Y ′ under Definition 9, the model has DAU-Y ′ under Definition 10 as well.
Proof. We proceed by showing that ρ
Note that the Lipschitz condition in Equation 1 is always satisfied when u = v. In addition, since the likelihood function ℓ in Definition 10 is always between 0 and 1, we have |ℓ(u)−ℓ(v)| ≤ 1 = d(u, v) when u v, so ℓ is 1-Lipschitz continuous. Therefore ρ * ℓ ≤ 1, and it suffices to
By [10, Theorem 4] , we get
so we are done. □ Second, we show that Theorems 2 and 4 still hold under the refined definition of DAU-Y ′ . Since the definitions of optimality and the empirical tests have not changed, we focus strictly on the nondiscrimination portions of the theorems. The proof of Theorem 8 is very similar to that of Theorem 2 and will thus be omitted. Proof. We present the proof for the case where Y ′ is continuous, but the proof for the discrete case is very similar. Let p 0 and p 1 be the probability density functions of Y ′ |Z =0 and Y ′ |Z =1, respectively. By Kantorovich duality [20, Equation 5 .4], we have (5) for all ϕ and ψ such that 
By the WYSIWYG worldview and the definition of equalized odds,
. Therefore, we can use the law of total probability to rewrite the first term on the right-hand side as Pr[Ŷ =1 | Z =1], and similarly the second term becomes Pr
. Finally, combining this inequality with the previous one gives us
which is what we want. □
We end this section with a brief discussion of the tightness of the above result. In the extreme example where ℓ is a step function over real-valued y ′ , ρ * ℓ is infinite, so we trivially have nondiscrimination under Definition 10. Therefore, in order to receive meaningful fairness guarantees from Theorem 9, we must make sure that ρ * ℓ is not too large. One way to achieve this is to apply the function ℓ to the construct space and reason about the transformed construct space. If any transformation of the construct space results in a finding of discrimination under Definition 10, then it is evidence that there could be a problem with the model with respect to discrimination. Letl denote the likelihood function on this transformed construct space. Then,l(y ′ ) = y ′ , so the transformation ensures that ρ * ℓ = 1.
HYBRID WORLDVIEWS
So far, we have assumed either the WAE or the WYSIWYG worldview. While these worldviews are interesting from a theoretical perspective, in practice it is unlikely that these worldviews hold. For example, for recidivism prediction as described in Example 1, there are reasons to believe that Y is tainted by past discrimination, rendering the WYSIWYG worldview unsuitable. On the other hand, the recorded recidivism rate Y is still strongly related to the actual reoffense rate Y ′ , so it is plausible that at least some of the racial disparity in Y is also present in the actual reoffense rate Y ′ . As a result, the WAE worldview is also unsuitable.
In this section, we propose a family of more realistic worldviews for the case where Y ′ and Y are categorical. As we have depicted in Figure 1 , worldviews describe the relationship between the construct and observed spaces. Because our definition of DAU-Y ′ has to do with inter-group disparities, here we focus specifically on the inter-group disparities in Y ′ and Y . Note that the WAE worldview has the effect of assuming that none of the disparity in Y is explained by Y ′ . By contrast, under the WYSIWYG worldview, all of the disparity in Y is explained by Y ′ . Described below is the α-Hybrid worldview, which is a family of worldviews that occupy the space between the two extremes of WAE and WYSIWYG. Worldview 3 (α-Hybrid, Categorical Y ′ ). Let α ∈ [0, 1]. Under the α-Hybrid worldview, exactly α fraction of the disparity in Y is explained by Y ′ . More formally,
It is easy to see that the WAE worldview is equivalent to the 0-Hybrid worldview. On the other hand, the relationship between the WYSIWYG and 1-Hybrid worldviews is only unidirectional. Although the WYSIWYG worldview implies the 1-Hybrid worldview, there are plenty of ways to satisfy d tv (Y ′ |Z =0, Y ′ |Z =1) = d tv (Y |Z =0, Y |Z =1) even when the equality Y ′ = Y does not hold. If we wanted to make the relationship bidirectional, we could instead have assumed that Y ′ can be broken down into two components, one of which satisfies WAE and the other WYSIWYG. However, this would mean that every component of Y ′ is either equal with respect to Z (WAE) or measurable (WYSIWYG), whereas in practice many inter-group disparities in the construct space are not easily measurable. Therefore, to make the α-Hybrid worldview more realistic, we sacrifice one direction of the relationship between the WYSIWYG and 1-Hybrid worldviews. Now we introduce the α-disparity test and prove that it is suitable for use with the α-Hybrid worldview. Unlike the demographic parity and equalized odds tests, the α-disparity test is parametrized and therefore can be applied to various real-world situations.
Theorem 10. If the α-Hybrid worldview holds, a model that passes the α-disparity test does not have DAU-Y ′ under Definition 9. Moreover, if the α-Hybrid worldview holds, every optimal model satisfies the α-disparity test.
Proof. To prove the first part of the theorem, we simply combine the inequality guaranteed by the α-disparity test (Equation 7) with the equation that defines the α-Hybrid worldview (Equation 6). Then, we get
which is what we want.
For the second part of the theorem, an optimal model has Y ′ =Ŷ , so we can substitute the Y ′ in Equation 6 withŶ to get
This is simply the equality in Equation 7, so we are done. □
We now compare the α-disparity test to demographic parity and equalized odds. 0-disparity is satisfied if and only if the output disparity is zero, so it is equivalent to demographic parity. In addition, we can easily adapt the proof of Theorem 4 to show that equalized odds implies 1-disparity. However, because equalized odds imposes a condition for each possible value of Y , 1-disparity does not imply equalized odds. Although it may thus seem that equalized odds is stronger and better than 1-disparity, recent results by Corbett-Davies and Goel [5] show that the threshold rule, which they argue is optimal, does not lead to equalized odds in general. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the stronger fairness guarantee provided by equalized odds and the higher utility that is attainable under 1-disparity. Of course, the 1-disparity test has the additional benefit that it can be generalized to other values of α.
If Y ′ and Y are numerical, a natural extension of the α-disparity test is
which is derived from applying the stronger notion of nondiscrimination described in Definition 10. For this to work, Worldview 3 would have to change to use the earthmover distance rather than the total variation distance. Since the earthmover distance is defined over a distance metric, the parameter α is not very meaningful unless Y ′ and Y have the same scale. As a result, here we consider the case where Y ′ and Y are defined over the same metric space (Y, d).
Unfortunately, Equation 8 is still not an empirical test because ρ * ℓ is defined in terms of Y ′ . Although it is tempting to redefine ρ * ℓ in terms of Y , it is possible for Y ′ and Y to have vastly different likelihood functions while having the same disparity, so this new empirical test will not guarantee the lack of DAU-Y ′ under Definition 10. We leave as future work the discovery of the appropriate empirical test for numerical Y ′ and Y under the α-Hybrid worldview.
CONCLUSION
We contributed to the ongoing debate about the definition of fairness in machine learning by showing that the choice between demographic parity and equalized odds boils down to one's worldview. In addition, we proved that calibration allows for a model with an arbitrarily large output disparity regardless of the worldview, arguing that calibration should not be used to enforce nondiscrimination as characterized by output disparity. Our work differs from much of the prior work in that we consider the construct as separate from the observed data. In particular, we interpreted the existing fairness definitions as acting on the observed data, whereas discrimination was viewed as a property of the construct. This bifurcation allowed us to handle the following issues simultaneously:
(1) Disparate impact can be justified by a sufficiently good reason such as a business necessity. (2) The observed data can be biased in an unjustified way due to past discrimination.
It is the second of these points that motivates our use of worldviews to characterize how biased the observed data is. To illustrate how this might work in practice, let us revisit the examples in Section 3. In Example 1, there are reasons to believe that the observed recidivism rate is a racially biased measurement of the actual reoffense rate. In Example 2, for various socioeconomic reasons, some protected groups may have disproportionately many people who take longer than six years to graduate but are eventually considered successful in the university. Therefore, the α-Hybrid worldview best characterizes these real-world scenarios, and the value of α reflects one's beliefs about how much more biased the observed data is than the construct. The creator of a model could then use the α-disparity test to make sure that the model does not have a discriminatory effect that is unexplainable by the construct.
Further generalizing the α-disparity test to non-categorical constructs is interesting future work that could broaden our understanding, in both theory and practice, of the issue of biased training data.
